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Graeme Newman (1985) perhaps said it best when he stated, “The only aspect of 
punishment that needs justification is its distribution” (p.4).  Newman was referencing the 
long history of punishment utilized and implemented throughout recorded history, from 
“punishment” on man from the physical environment, perceived punishments from religious 
gods, to punishment imposed by society.  Punishment imposed by societies has a long (and 
often times sordid) past from banishment and fines in ancient Greece, torturous physical 
punishment during the Inquisition, the implementation of the death penalty in 17
th
 century 
England,  rehabilitative practices utilized by Britain and the United States into the 20
th
 
century, and the extreme occurrence of incarceration currently implemented in the United 
States.  These examples are but a brief glimpse into the history of punishment and suggest that 
punishment, in some form, has always existed.   
 
Justifications for Punishment 
 
The punishment of wrongdoings is typically categorized in the following four justifications: 
retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation and incapacitation (societal protection).  There is also 
discussion and promotion of additional criminological tactics such as restorative justice and 
therapeutic jurisprudence as new and innovative responses to traditional punishment 
responses.  This paper will outline the logical and historical practices of the above approaches 
to punishment.  Additionally, a discussion of state crime will be provided as well as an 
analysis of which punishment response is most fitting in instances of state crime.     
The question of what exactly determines punishment, or what punishment is, is generally 
agreed upon by the following technical definitions.  Bean (1981) states that punishment, 
through the lens of a sanction that is imposed upon an individual for a criminal offense, is 
made up of five specific elements: 
1) The sanction must be perceived as unpleasant to the victim 
2) The sanction must only be for an actual or alleged offense. 
3) The sanction must be of an offender, actual or supposed 
4) The sanction must be handed out by personal agencies and the sanction must not 
be a natural cause/consequence of the criminal action. 
5) The sanction must be carried out by the “state.”  In other words, the 
authority/institution that the offense is committed against shall be the one to 
carry out the sanction.  (p.5-6).   
 
Newman (2008), when building on the definition provided by H. L. A. Hart, defines 
punishment as: 
1) Punishment must involve pain or unpleasant consequences. 
2) Punishment must be a sanction for an offense against a specific rule or law. 
3) Punishment must be executed upon the specific offender who has allegedly or 
actually committed the crime. 
4) It must be administered intentionally by someone other than the offender. 
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5) “It must be imposed and administered by an authority constituted by a legal 
system against which the offense is committed” (p.7-11).   
 
What is located in the above definitions is a synthesis of the idea the punishment must be 
considered unpleasant for the offender, must be a direct action taken upon the offender for an 
actual or alleged crime, and it must be imposed and administered by an authority within in a 
legal system.  While the above definitions of punishment may be somewhat agreed upon, the 
reasoning as to why offenders should be punished is littered with philosophical and 
criminological debate. The four traditional explanations provided include retribution, 
deterrence, rehabilitation and incapacitation.     
 
Retribution 
 
Retribution is often considered to be the oldest form of punishment, and is often viewed as 
society’s “revenge” for a moral wrongdoing by an individual. In other words, punishment is 
justified simply because it is deserved.  If an individual commits a crime, they deserved to be 
punished.  Kant and Hegel, two avid proponents of the retributive approach, each provided 
different justifications for this punishment response.  Hegel believed that the state had the 
right to punish using retributive measures, as it was essentially more important and powerful 
than the individuals that made up the state, and demanded a sacrifice when crimes were 
committed against it (Newman, 1985).  Foucault (1977), states “Besides its immediate victim, 
the crime attacks the sovereign: it attacks him personally, since the law represents the will of 
the sovereign; it attacks him physically, since the force of the law is the force of the prince” 
(p. 47).  Kant, however, believed that retributive punishment was a necessity to restore the 
balance that the crime unhinged between the state (governing body), the people, and the 
criminal.  For Kant, it was not about punishment being a debt owed to the state, but a debt 
owed to the people, and the state was simply an actor charged with protecting its people.  
Foucault (1977) suggests that this form of punishment was most utilized prior to the 18
th
 
century when torture and executions were public and common.  The purpose of punishment 
was retributive and punishment was focused primarily on the physical body.   
Retribution approaches also suggest that there are agreed upon rules within society, and 
those who violate those rules must be punished to uphold those values and rules.  Banks 
(2013) states, “Once society has decided upon a set of legal rules, the retributivist sees those 
rules as representing and reflecting the moral order” (p. 109).  Newman states that for the 
retributivist, “punishment restores an equilibrium that was upset by the crime” (p. 192). 
Durkheim suggested that punishing criminals who committed moral wrongdoings was a way 
in which society could further create and maintain moral awareness and he approved of such 
“mechanisms of punishment reinforcing the moral indignation, the collective sentiment, and 
thus the morality of society” (Newman, 2008, p. 274).   
Retribution is further illuminated by its proposal that punishment should be in proportion 
to the crime.  It is here that retributionists’ provide a separation from retribution and 
vengeance. Critiques of the retribution approach often suggest that it is simply glorified 
vengeance.  However, Noziak (2001) suggest that whereas vengeance may happen to an 
innocent person, retribution is carried out by legitimate authorities who have identified an 
actual or presumed offender.  Furthermore, legal retribution mechanisms outline strict 
procedural practice which implements limits on crime (Banks, 2013).     
Perhaps the clearest justification for retribution practice comes from the lex talionis 
derived from biblical times (Banks, 2013), and the basic principle “that punishment should 
inflict the same on the offender as the offender has inflicted on his or her victim” (p. 110).  
Specific biblical passages that are used to support this claim include: “but if there is serious 
injury, you are to take life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, 
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burn for burn, wound for wound, bruise for bruise (NIV; Exodus 21: 23-25).”  In the book of 
Leviticus 24:17, Moses states “If anyone takes the life of a human being, he must be put to 
death” and in Deuteronomy 19:21 “Show no pity: life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, 
hand for hand, foot for foot.”  Retributionists often cite these passages as divine support for 
the idea of retribution style punishment and suggest it is morally justifiable. However, the 
biblical passages that promote reconciliation, forgiveness and rebuke retribution are often 
ignored (Ephesians 4:32; Hebrews 12:14; Luke 6: 27-42; Matthew 18:33).   
The idea of censure is also principally important in the understanding of retribution.  
Andrew von Hirsch, a support of the “just deserts” model, suggests that “censure is simply 
holding someone accountable for his or her conduct and involves conveying the message to 
the perpetrator that he or she has willfully injured someone and faces the disapproval of 
society for that reason” (Banks, 2013, p. 110).  H. Morris (1994) suggests that the main 
benefit of this type of punishment is the effect that it will have on the offender and suggests 
that punishment for their specific offense will reflect the communal values they have broken 
and they will eventually determine to act according to those values. Both Hirsch and Morris 
contend that there is a deterrent effect enveloped in retributive punishment.      
Until the 1970s, the idea of retribution as a justification for punishment was considered to 
be vengeful.  In the 1980s, a new form of retribution theory occurred and was known as “just 
deserts” (Banks, 2013).  Just deserts model suggested that not only did a criminal need to be 
punished because his criminal act was wrong, but that this punishment needed to be 
proportional to the crime.  It is here that modern day retributionists separated retributive 
punishment from vengeance.  Punishment should be proportional to the crime, and should not 
be considered vengeful as there are limits to the punishment and procedural standards to be 
followed.  Essentially, a scale of punishments is allocated and the most severe punishments 
are reserved for the most severe offenses, frequently accepted as tariff sentencing.  Banks 
(2013) elaborates, “In this method of punishing, the offender’s potential to commit future 
offenses does not come into consideration, but his or her previous convictions are taken into 
account because most proponents of just deserts support reductions in sentence for first 
offenders” (p.113).  When quoting Hudson (1996), Banks (2013) suggests that one of the 
fundamental issues with just deserts theory is doesn’t provide a clear outline of a “properly 
commensurate sentence.”  Furthermore, the just deserts model of retribution fails to take into 
account any social issues, such as disadvantage or discrimination that may increase the 
likelihood of an individual committing a crime.   
 
Deterrence 
 
Deterrence theory is considered more of an early modern approach to crime in which 
punishment is viewed as a social disruption which society must control.  This perspective 
maintains that people act rationally and are self-interested, thus deterrence works because the 
punishment is more painful than the crime is pleasurable.  Beccaria and Bentham are often 
credited with the first analytical discussion of deterrence, clearly outlined in their utilitarian 
approach to punishment.  At the crux of Beccaria’s argument is his insistency on the 
inhumane nature of the response to crime during the time of his writing (1760s) and that 
punishment needed to have a preventative, not a retributive, function.  More specifically, for 
Utilitarian's such as Bentham and Beccaria, the only purpose of punishment was to prevent or 
deter future crime.   
Whereas retribution theorists focus on past events, utilitarian's and deterrence theorists' 
focused on future issues.  If the punishment does not prevent future crime, than it simply adds 
to the suffering of a society.  Punishment is not so much about if an individual deserves to be 
punished, but if punishment will have a deterrent effect both on the individual and society as a 
whole.  Regardless of the form of punishment, the primary focus is to deter individuals from 
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committing a criminal act in the future.  We find evidence of this in the United States’ “get 
tough on crime” approach, specifically with the “3 strikes” drug rule.   
 
Rehabilitation  
 
Both retribution and deterrence are focused primarily with the crime and then the punishment.  
The rehabilitation reasoning for punishment approaches punishment from a different angle. 
The rehabilitative model is a modern strategy of responding to crime which is often linked to 
the emergence of the social sciences.  This response to crime suggests that crimes are 
committed as a result of individual or social problems and the best response to crime is to 
eliminate such personal and social problems.  The rehabilitative response looks specifically 
into the criminals social past, which is absent in both retributive and deterrence philosophies.  
The attempt to “rehabilitate” is often done by treatment that is specifically geared towards the 
offender.   
Proponents of the rehabilitative model, in contrast to both retribution and deterrence, 
suggest that punishment should be specifically designed for the offender, not the offense 
(Banks, 2013).  The notion of rehabilitation encompasses a deterrent effect, as it is suspected 
that with rehabilitation the offender will be less likely to commit crimes in the future.  
Rehabilitation models tend to include programs specifically designed towards the problems 
that an offender personally faces.  For example, required drug treatment programs and high 
school and college completion courses as part of probation or offered during incarceration are 
examples of rehabilitative attempts.   
Garland (2002) notes that the rehabilitative model was widely used in the United States 
until the 1970s, when it was determined that rehabilitation didn’t work in controlling or 
preventing crime.  This was a result of a variety of factors and Martinson’s (1974) article 
(which may have been misinterpreted) suggested that no treatment program had been shown 
to reduce or prevent recidivism in offending.   
 
Incapacitation 
 
Incapacitation, or societal protection, is a modern response to crime that is often much easier 
to implement than rehabilitative models.  Incapacitation is the notion that the primary goal of 
punishment is incapacitate the offender, which is done to protect society as a whole from any 
future offenses that a criminal may commit.  Incapacitation often results in incarceration, 
which may include some levels of rehabilitation, but this is not the primary purpose.  The 
primary purpose is to protect society from the potential danger that the criminal may impose.  
Foucault (1977) suggests that incapacitation was essentially all about the power that the state 
could exert over its citizens and reflected the change from punishment directly inflected upon 
the body, to punishment directed on the mind.  Primarily, this power is reflected in the states’ 
ability to constantly monitor those who are incarcerated.  However, he suggested that 
“imprisonment not as penalty, but as holding the person and their body for security” (p. 118).  
Furthermore, Foucault notes the use of the carceral as an attempt to not just monitor, but also 
as an avenue with which to “reform” prisoners.    
There is support for incapacitation within the utilitarian theory, as the removal of the 
offender from society prevents the criminal from harming society (Banks, 2013).  This 
justification for incapacitation as a form of punishment is criticized as it rests on the idea that 
a criminal might commit a future offense and the morality associated with that claim.  
Incapacitation not only considers the current crime committed, but the likelihood that future 
infractions may occur.   
Incapacitation as means of justification for punishment runs rampant within the United 
States.  According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, in 2010 the United States housed 
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approximately 1,612,395 prisoners in both state and federal prisons, the highest rate in the 
world.  Interestingly, the United States is not the most violent country in the world, but it 
incarcerates the most criminals.  This is largely the result of moral panic, mandatory 
minimum sentencing, three-strike legislation, and the prosecution of victimless crime.  
However, the focus of incapacitation was not always utilized for societal protection as its 
main goals.  Kifer et al (2003) notes:  
 
During the Jacksonian era, prisons were designed to rehabilitate criminals through 
the use of solitary confinement, which it was hoped would induce penitence.  These 
prisons never adequately achieved the goal of rehabilitation, however and the 
primary focus of prison soon turned to incapacitation.  During the reformatory era, 
the primary goal of prisons again became rehabilitation.  The goals of imprisonment 
changed yet again in the late 1960s and early 197s, in response to intense criticism of 
the rehabilitation model.  It its place, retributionists called for a “human 
incarceration” approach to imprisonment, or incapacitation.  Today, incapacitation is 
the accepted and prevailing response to crime. (p.47-48).   
 
It is important to note that retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation and incapacitation as 
justifications for punishment are not static terms, but can essentially be quite fluid.  Criminal 
justice policies often reflect numerous justifications, incorporating factors such as deterrence 
and incapacitation within their applications. 
 
Restorative Justice   
  
While restorative justice is a relatively new technique as a response to crime, it is one of the 
oldest forms of criminal justice.  Braithwaite (1998) offers that it was utilized in ancient 
Greek, Arab and Roman civilizations, and has deep seeded roots in a variety of religious 
traditions.  Kurki (2000) describes restorative justice as being “based on values that promote 
repairing harm, healing, and rebuilding relations among victims, the offenders, and the 
communities” (p. 236). One of the major differences between traditional justifications of 
punishment (retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation) and restorative justice 
is that the state or legal governing body does not always play a central part.   Kurki (2000) 
further suggests: 
 
Core restorative justice ideals imply that government should surrender its monopoly 
over responses to crime to those who are directly affected—the victim, the offender, 
and the community.  Restorative justice considers crime to be an offense against an 
individual or community, not the state, and this is where it sharply divides from the 
current American criminal justice system of penalization. The goal is to restore the 
victim and the community and to rebuild fractured relationships in process that 
allows all three parties to participate (p. 236). 
  
Banks (2013) further notes, “Rather than separating out the offender as a subject for 
rehabilitation, restorative justice sees social support and social control of offenders as the 
means to rehabilitation” (p. 118).  Restorative justice is not a lenient option for offenders, and 
requires accountability of the offender and restitution to the victim.  In the traditional 
American criminal justice system, reparations paid are not to the victim, but to the state, and it 
is almost always in the form of incarceration of the offender. Restorative justice provides 
numerous options for restitution, including monetary repayment, community service activity, 
or participation in treatment plans.  In restorative justice practices, the crime committed is 
primarily viewed by how it has destroyed a relationship between members of a community, 
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and the desire is to address this broken relationship and attempt to repair it.  Punitive justice 
however, is most concerned with penalizing, or punishing, the offender and this often results 
in a total separation of the offender from both the victim and community.   
Restorative justice practices have been used as a response to a variety of crimes in the 
United States, primarily in diversion programs for “juveniles in minor, nonviolent, and 
nonsexual crimes (Kurki, 2000, p. 241),” and are often supported or create by faith based 
organizations.  In fact, the first North American victim-offender mediation program in 
Ontario was established by the Mennonite Central Committee workers in 1974 and Kurki 
suggests that “religion and moral theory still provide strong backgrounds for restorative 
justice” (p. 240).  Restorative Justice often takes shape as victim-offender mediation, peace 
circles, and other community initiatives that provide alternatives to the traditional 
incarceration model and places the control of penalization back in the hands of those affected 
by the crime.  Since the 1970s, the United States has slowly implemented restitution and 
community service as part of select sentencing.  Furthermore, with the victims’ movement of 
the 1990s, restorative justice apparatuses often provide a vehicle in which victims voices may 
be heard.   
Garland (1990) and others suggest that the ideas and justifications for punishment as 
described above are not a static, moral understanding, but often a reflection of current cultural 
values that greatly influenced by social structures.  It could be suggested, as evident in the 
United States with the reemergence of retribution practices, that moral explanations of 
punishment tend to be cyclical.  Justifications for crime tend to evolve, change, and often 
times blend, largely as a result of the current political climate.   
 
What works for state crime? 
 
The above theories of punishment are often utilized to justify punishment for what are 
considered traditional crimes. These crimes traditionally include murder, rape, larceny, and 
theft along with a variety of other types of crimes, both violent and not.  These types of 
crimes are often committed by one, or a few, offenders.  State crime, however, is often the 
result of many simultaneous offenses and offenders, all including a variety of social and 
individualistic reasons. Rothe (2009) states, “there is variation in accountability and 
responsibility under international laws for states versus individuals” (p. 157).   In addition, 
state crime often results in a plethora of victims at varying levels. Because of the vast range of 
offenders usually participating in an instance of state crime, and the general complexity of 
state crime, it becomes difficult to identify only one theory as appropriate for addressing state 
crime. Research suggests, and I am inclined to agree, that because that complexity associated 
with state crime, all theories of punishment and their applications may be useful in 
understanding state crime.   
Chambliss’s 1989 presidential address to the American Society of Criminology is 
arguably noted as the first time the discussion of state crime was discussed professionally on 
such a large scale.  He suggested that state crimes be defined as “acts defined by law as 
criminal and committed by state officials in pursuit of their jobs as representatives of the 
state” (p. 184).  The Schwendingers (1970) and Green and Ward (2000) suggested that state 
crime should not be defined simply by the legality of the act, but that the definition of state 
crime should include the violation of human rights.  According to Kramer and Michalowski 
(2005) state crime is defined as “any action that violates public international law, international 
criminal law, or domestic law when these actions are committed by individuals acting in 
office or cover capacity as agents of the state pursuant to expressed or implied orders of the 
state, or resulting from state failure to exercise due diligence over the actions of its agents (p. 
448).” Rothe (2006) defines state crime as “Any action that violates international public law, 
and/or a state’s own domestic law when these actions are committed by individuals actors 
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acting on behalf or in the name of the state, even when such acts are motivated by their 
personal, economical, political, and ideological interests” (p.6).  Most criminologists agree, to 
some extent, that violation of international law is inclusive to define state crime (Rothe and 
Friedrichs, 2006).  Prominent examples of state crimes include crimes against humanity, 
genocide (also considered a crime of globalization), terrorism, torture and war crimes.   
In the following sections the majority of discussion will be geared towards the state 
crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.  The majority of discussion will 
be based on the case study of the applications of restorative justice in Rwanda following the 
1994 Rwandan genocide.  While a variety of other nations have utilized restorative justice 
mechanisms following instances of state crime (i.e., Truth Commissions in South Africa and 
Sierra Leone), Gacaca courts in Rwanda are perhaps historically the largest attempts at 
restorative justice following state crime.   
Noticeably absent are other types of state crime, most particularly state-corporate crimes.  
Michalowski and Kramer (2005) coined this term to refer to the harmful collaborations of 
state and corporations and suggest that “when economic and political powers purse common 
interests, the potential for harm is magnified” (p.1).  The case studies of state-corporate crime 
most frequently analyzed are those of the 1986 Challenger explosion which looks at the 
relationship between NASA and Morton Thiokol, the Ford Pinto and the relationship between 
Ford and the United States Government, and the fire at the Imperial Food Products chicken-
processing plant in North Carolina, where the relationship between Imperial, the federal 
government, and state local officials was examined.  The reason that state-corporate crime 
will not be discussed further is that “punishment” for these crimes has been all but non-
existent.   
As discussed above, selecting one model of theoretical support for punishment regarding 
state crime is incredibly complex.  Cohen (1995) notes the particular difficulty with this, as 
often locations of state crimes are going through transitional periods.  This transitional period 
includes attempting to rebuild their state after a mass atrocity has been carried out by 
governmental officials.  The concept of “justice in transition” often encompasses aspects of 
retribution, incapacitation and restorative justice.  Rothe (2006) further notes that punishment 
in the face of state crime is not simply about accountability but about transitional justice 
mechanisms which include both accountability practices and restorative aspects.   
Following the atrocities and crimes of the Second World War, the Nuremberg trials were 
conducted from 1946-1948 to prosecute prominent military and political figures responsible 
for the Holocaust.  Following the trials, human rights were introduced into international law 
via the Nuremberg Charter.  The charter provided principles to determine what defined a war 
crime and was used to codify the legal principles that were established and used during the 
Nuremburg Trials.  These principles clearly lay out “crimes against humanity” to include 
murder and extermination, and on December 9, 1948 the United Nations adopted the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes of Genocide.   
Additionally, The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment all clearly state that 
those committing torture should be prosecuted for their crimes. In addition, there are more 
than 20 legally binding international treaties that deal with a person’s right to exist (Alveraz, 
2010).  The International Criminal Court (ICC), enacted in July 2002, is a permanent tribunal 
to address crimes against humanity including war crimes, crimes of aggression, and genocide.  
The Rome Statute of the ICC states that the ICC can only investigate and prosecute 
perpetrators of war crimes in states that are either unwilling or unable to do so themselves.  
The ICC has authority to “investigate and prosecute these types of crimes on a permanent and 
ongoing basis (p. 140).”   
It is evident that there is a long list of international legal precedent that makes a variety of 
state crimes illegal.  It is suggested that codified legal law could certainly act as a deterrent 
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and Rothe (2006) states “The UN, the World Court, and the new ICC are uniquely positioned 
to act as global dispute resolutions agents. While possessing a clear mandate, these 
organizations have no real authority or ability to use coercive force.”  (p. 163).  Rothe further 
notes that “the failure of international law to act as a deterrent is the result of the lack of 
effectual enforcement mechanisms.  After all, states that hold vast economic, military and 
political power within the international arena have long ignored international law as a frame 
for their behaviors if it conflicted with their foreign policy interests” (p. 161).  It is unknown 
if international legal institutions would have a deterrent effect, but part of the explanation for 
this unknown is that they lack enforcement.  While legal laws exist to prevent occurrences of 
state crime, they are simply rarely enforced.   
The ICC and the International Criminal Tribunals are often utilized as means of 
retribution for perpetrators of state crime.  From a retributive standpoint, these tribunals 
deliver punishment and sanctions because the individuals broke international and national 
laws, and deserve to be punished.  The International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) was created under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in 1993 as a result of 
the violations of international humanitarian rights committed in Yugoslavia between 1991 and 
1993.  The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was created to address genocidal acts 
committed between January 1994 and December 1994.  The ICTY has charged approximately 
171 criminals, and the ICTR has indicted 95 individuals which included a total of 30 
perpetrators serving prison sentences (Rothe, 2009).  The UN Security Council requested the 
closure of the ICTR by December 2014 and the responsibilities of the tribunal have been 
transferred to the UN International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals. The number 
of those indicted and convicted seems incredibly small compared to the vast number of 
individuals who were perpetrators of genocidal acts.  However, funding for the criminal 
tribunals as well as lack of staff and resources slows down the process considerably.  
Additionally, it is typically that only top level offenders and perpetrators are tried at criminal 
tribunals.  The remaining offenders are often dealt with domestically.  
Domestically, state crime criminals are often tried at a variety of local courts or truth 
commissions.  While these courts often achieve retributive ends, their roots are often based in 
themes of restorative justice.  From a retributive standpoint, local courts are still charged with 
the objective of criminal sentencing.  Perhaps the best example of a domestic court with a 
punitive function is the Gacaca courts located in Rwanda.  Following the genocide in 1994, 
the new government was responsible for addressing the 100,000 people accused of genocide 
and war crimes which overwhelmed the limited judicial capacity.  Only 14 public prosecutors 
and 39 criminal investigators were left and two thirds of the nation’s judges had been killed or 
fled the country.  By the year 2000, over 120,000 genocidaires were in Rwandans prisons and 
it was more likely they would die before they ever appeared in court (Harrell, 2003).   
Because of this, the government implemented Gacaca courts.  Organic Law 40/2000 was 
established in 2000, and established 11,000 Gacaca jurisdictions, which include 
approximately 250,000 Rwandans who serve on Gacaca in some capacity. Gacaca was 
responsible for the trying and sentencing of all genocidal crimes with the exception of those 
responsible for the planning and organization of the genocide, which were referred to the 
ICTR.   As of 2012, approximately 2 million genocides had been tried, with 65% being found 
quality.  Guilty verdicts resulted in imprisonment and others participated in community 
service or some other form of reparation.    
Truth Commissions are often utilized domestically to address state crimes.  The first 
Truth Commission was enacted in Uganda in 1974 and as of 2002, there have been 19 Truth 
Commissions across the globe.  The purpose of Truth Commissions is to create a report on 
human rights violations which includes testimony provided by human rights victims.  
However, some Truth Commissions also have the legislative power to grant amnesty to 
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offenders and recommend prosecution, as was the case with the South Africa Truth and 
Reconciliation Committee and the Sierra Leone Truth Commission. (Rothe, 2008).   
It is evident that a both domestic and international apparatuses are in place to provide 
retributive functions following state crime and have had varying levels of success.  
Additionally, Truth Commissions, domestic courts such as Gacaca, and International Criminal 
Tribunals all participate in incapacitation.  For those who commit the most heinous grievances 
against humanity and are known to have planned and executed mass killings, it is generally 
supported that for the safety of society, these perpetrators should be incarcerated.  There are 
few people who believe that Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean Bosco Barayagwiza and General Ante 
Gotovina should be free.  However, these apparatuses often have dual functions.  The purpose 
of both Truth Commissions and the Gacaca courts in Rwanda was not only to appropriate 
responsibility, but to provide justice and reconciliation.  It is here that we note the restorative 
justice applications of these apparatus.   
Traditional criminal justice systems are offender-oriented, meaning that the focus of the 
criminal justice system is focused largely on punishment of the offender.  Restorative justice 
is victim-orientated, and provides much broader terms and more complex analyses in 
establishing who the “victim” is.  In many instances of state crime, it becomes difficult to 
determine who exactly is a victim and who is the offender, which makes selecting one form of 
traditional punishment difficult.  State crimes such as genocide are often the result of mass 
hysteria, propaganda, and moral panic which often causes irrational acts of violence.  Looking 
at offenders within the general population who may have fallen prey to mass hysteria 
propaganda and moral panic in the same lens with which organizers of state crime are viewed 
is often problematic.   Furthermore, in instances of state crime, it becomes difficult to pigeon 
hole individuals to one category, either “victim” or “offender.”  Often times multiple roles are 
occupied (Sullivan and Tifft, 2005).   
Restorative justice practices are focused on not only addressing the harm caused by and 
endured by victims and offenders, but it focuses on the harm inflicted upon the community as 
well.  Through the restorative justice process, the needs of all three components are addressed, 
by actively taking steps to repair the harm that resulted by involving all parties that are 
involved, and involving the community in restorative process.   
Gacaca courts in Rwanda were charged not only with the punitive end of justice, but the 
primary role of Gacaca was to foster forgiveness and reconciliation among remaining 
Rwandans. In fact, Gacaca courts have been considered the largest attempts at implementing 
restorative justice that the world has seen.  Following the slaughter of approximately 1 million 
people in 90 days, traditional incarceration was simply not an option.  Imprisoning over 
100,000 perpetrators of state crime in a country that just lost a large portion of its population 
was not feasible for economical as well as social reasons (i.e. loss of labor).  It has been noted 
that restorative justice was most applicable in Rwanda because there was no other option.  
Perhaps that is true.  However, victims were able to take an active role in the legal process 
and offenders were encouraged to take responsibility for their actions and make reparations.  
This partially puts justice in the hands of victims.   Gacaca courts allowed those already in 
prison to be released to participate in Gacaca.  If Gacaca determined their guilt and the 
offender provide information about his or her crime as well as experienced remorse, their 
prison sentence was often suspended and the duration of their time was to be spent in their 
communities provided community service.  This example illustrates how restorative justice 
measures address the needs of victims, offenders and the community and focuses on repairing 
the harm to all three apparatuses.   
Because restorative justice measures often encompass (to varying degrees) a variety of 
punishment responses, it is often an appropriate avenue in which to address the punishments 
of very complex state crimes. Restorative justice opens itself to rehabilitation of the offender, 
yet also allows for retribution and incapacitation, as is needed for those who organize and 
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perpetrate the most heinous of crimes.  Uniquely, it allows victims voices to be heard, and for 
them to take an active role in the criminal justice process.  Restorative justice apparatuses 
focus on justice, reconciliation, and reparation for the community, victim and offender. This 
dual triangular relationship essentially does not exist in other punishment models and often 
times makes restorative justice a logistical choice. However, the logistical end should not over 
shadow the potential therapeutic nature of this approach.   
The punishment response to state crime is notoriously difficult due to the complexity of 
the crime and those involved.  However, as mass atrocities and crimes against humanity 
continue, an appropriate response to this type of crime is needed.  Truth and Reconciliation 
Committees, International Criminal Tribunals, and Gacaca courts in Rwanda provide 
examples of how restorative justice apparatuses operate and potentially address the needs of 
those who survive instances of state crime.  Further research of these types of apparatuses is 
needed to further understand the appropriate punishment response.   
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